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PANEL TWO:
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
CORPORATE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION:
LAW, POLICY, THEORY
INTRODUCTION

ANN F. THOMAS, MODERATOR7
In this panel we will be examining the not-for-profit sector and
corporate philanthropy from the perspectives of tax policy and tax theory.
The four papers being presented by this panel address a wide range of
issues. Professor Sugin's paper examines the inconsistencies in corporate
theory and tax theory that are revealed by the allowance of a tax deduction
for corporate philanthropy. Professor Hill's paper discusses the use of
exempt organizations as conduits between corporations and political
candidates for public office, and the election and tax law issues raised by
these conduit relationships. Professor Knauer's paper confronts the policy
implications of tax incentives and other forms of governmental intervention
used to direct corporate philanthropy and otherwise promote the
substitution of the not-for-profit sector for government when it is
politically expedient. Our final panelist, Professor Shaviro, will lead us
back to first principles by critiquing the models of economic theory that
are seen as justifying the tax exemptions enjoyed by the not-for-profit
sector.
Panel One presented some very interesting quantitative data concerning
corporate philanthropy and offered us an important historical perspective
of the issue. With those presentations in mind, our panelists will shift the
focus to the tax policy choices that surround corporate philanthropy.
From its earliest days, the federal income tax has supported
philanthropic endeavors. Initially, this was seen in the tax relief given to
organizations that were religious, philanthropic, or charitable in their
nature. The notion of tax relief for religious and charitable organizations
is ancient. It precedes our country's income tax by thousands of years.
In the ancient world, religious institutions enjoyed exemptions from tax,
apparently based upon the idea that their property belonged to the gods.'
A tax exemption for religious and charitable organizations appeared in the
1894 version of the federal tax law, which was also the first major effort
for a permanent income tax.' The 1894 income tax did not survive
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Constitutional scrutiny,3 but when the income tax was revived, the concept
of a tax exemption for this sort of activity was restored as well. It has
been with us ever since.4
The idea of a tax deduction for donors who make gifts or contributions
to religious and philanthropic institutions was not part of the first U.S.
income tax statutes. 5 Indeed, this deduction was proposed but rejected in
the 1913 debate.6 But with the increase in the tax rates in 1917, which
accompanied the entry of the United States into World War I, the
charitable contribution deduction for individuals became part of the
Internal Revenue Code.7 Given the rather narrow tax base that existed at
that time, Congress apparently was swayed by the argument that even
taxpayers who were wealthy and usually philanthropic might respond to
the sharp rate increases by reducing charitable contributions. 8 Although
the tax rate increases of 1917 proved to be temporary, the charitable
contribution deduction for individual donors was a permanent change that
has remained an important feature of the Code through many tax reforms.
As the speakers in Panel One have told us, we have not actually had
a tax deduction for corporate charitable contributions for all that long.
The corporate charitable deduction first became part of the Code in 1935
and at that time was limited to five percent of taxable income. 9
Interestingly, this provision did not start out as a part of the New Deal
agenda. The successful passage of the provision is attributed to the
combined efforts of business and fund-raisers." The provision did not
change until the Reagan administration amendments of 1981. At that
point, the five percent allowance was doubled to ten percent."
Earlier this morning David Morgan presented a very interesting and
important distributional analysis of the corporations and industries that
claim a tax deduction for corporate philanthropy. He also provided us
with updated estimates of the aggregate numbers involved. In 1993, it is
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estimated that corporations contributed $5.92 billion to charities.' 2 David
Morgan told us this morning that in 1995 corporations claimed upwards
of $8 billion in charitable deductions. These numbers reflect corporate
charitable philanthropy in a narrow sense, encompassing only the
contribution of money, goods, or other property by corporations that have
current profits. These figures do not include either contributions from
corporate private foundations or a broader range of corporate philanthropy
in the form of employee released time and other contributions of services.
However, $8 billion is a large number even without these other
contributions factored in, and it represents a level of economic activity and
arguably, a tax subsidy, that deserves serious attention.
The first panel that we heard today gave us a sense of the scope and
size of the not-for-profit sector in the United States. It is without question
a sizable part of our economy and a large force in our national life. The
estimates that Dr. Morgan provided are a useful reference point in thinking
about the size and scope of the not-for-profit sector in the United States.
As he pointed out, the $8 billion estimate of corporate philanthropy
represents a little less than six percent of the total charitable contributions
for that year, which his numbers placed at upwards of $140 billion.
Estimates of the number of charitable organizations in the United States
range from 1.5 million to more than 6 million, depending on whether you
count local chapters as separate organizations.' Another way to think
about the size of the not-for-profit sector is to consider its role in the labor
market. In 1990, not-for-profit organizations employed more than ten
percent of the work force in the United States. 14 Few other industrial
groupings account for this large a slice of the labor market. From many
points of view the not-for-profit sector, funded by tax deductible
contributions from individuals and corporate philanthropy, is quite visible
and quite large.
One of the more interesting things about the not-for-profit sector in the
United States has been the dramatic increase in its size over the last thirty
years. Our first panel this morning developed this history for us. An
obvious question then is: why have we seen this dramatic increase in the
number of not-for-profit organizations? Our panelists here and later today
will be contributing to our understanding of the issue in the context of the
United States. However, it has become increasingly clear that this
phenomenon is being seen in many other parts of the world as well. One
commentator, Lester Salamon, has called the growth of these not-for-profit
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and non-governmental organizations a "global associational revolution." 5
Professor Salamon suggests that this global associational revolution
may prove to be as significant for the latter part of the twentieth century
as the nation state was in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
History will judge the ultimate influence of the not-for-profit
organizations, but we can take Professor Salamon's prediction as an
indication of the scope and potential of this sector to reshape economies,
the role of government, and the body politic itself. All over the world we
can see an increase in the numbers of people who form voluntary
associations and an increase in the financial resources of these
associations. 7
I believe this growing sector has put an enormous amount of pressure
on our traditional ideas about what philanthropy is and what role tax law
plays in it. Whether you want to think about the tax benefits conferred
upon the not-for-profit sector as an indirect subsidy-a tax expenditure
arising from the tax exemptions for organizations and tax deductions for
donors-or if you just want to think about the tax benefits in terms of the
lost revenue; it's there, it's big, and it's pressing. In this context of
growth and change and associational revolutions, it is entirely appropriate
to go back and re-examine the tax policies that underlie and support
philanthropy and the not-for-profit sector.
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